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I. INTRODUCTION
James Crawford observes:'
Central to the Constitution and the operation of a court system is the
judiciary: in a real sense, the judge is the court. How judges are ap-
pointed, how their independence is maintained, how and on what
grounds they can be removed, and what other (non-judicial) functions
they can properly perform are thus important questions.
These matters and other issues are the subject of this report.
1I. RECRUITMENT OF JUDGES
A. Appointment
In Australia the appointment of judges is, by constitution or statute,
universally the responsibility of the executive branch. The federal gov-
ernment handles all such matters relating to the High Court, the Federal
Court, the Family Court and other federal judicial bodies. State govern-
ments exercise similar authority over the state supreme courts, district
and magistrates' courts. All appointments are formally made by the
Governor-General, or the Governor, in Council.
Eligibility for appointment is primarily limited to the statutory
requisite of admission or practice as a barrister and/or solicitor within
the relevant jurisdiction. Crawford comments that "once these not very
exacting requirements are met, the appointment is at the discretion of
the executive."2 In practice, therefore, the Attorney General, as the ex-
ecutive in charge of putting forward nominations to the Cabinet, is
' B.A. Wisconsin; J.D. Cornell; LL.M. Monash. Director, Litigation Reform Commission,
Queensland, Australia; formerly Director, Asia-Pacific Law Institute, Bond University, Queensland,
Australia.
- B.A., LL.B. Natal; LL.M. Cambridge; Ph.D. Canterbury. Chief Executive Officer,
Queensland Law Society, Australia; formerly Foundation Professor and Dean of the School of
law, Bond University, Queensland, Australia.
J. CRAwFoRD, AuSTRALIAN COURTS OF LAW 55 (1988).
2 id.
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vested with considerable responsibility. Once nominated, ratification of
the appointment is a collective cabinet decision.
Not surprisingly, this process of executive appointment leaves the
system open to charges of political patronage or bias. The Honorable
Justice Thomas writes:3
It is obvious that the selection of the best candidates virtually prevents
serious problems from arising. Confidence in the honesty of the Gov-
ernment in making judicial selections is a necessary pre-requisite not
only to the maintenance of ethical standards but also to the mainte-
nance of public respect for the judiciary.
Crawford maintains that party political appointments have been rare in
Australia and that those which may have originated in party maneuvers
have usually been defensible on other grounds.4
However, the occasional political appointment is a problem. On a
microcosmic level, it arguably detrdcts from the perceived independence
of the bench as a whole in the eyes of those who do not perceive the
checks and balances as an effective system. The former concern is usu-
ally neutralized by de facto controls exerted by judges in the course of
their daily duties. Containment of damage potentially arising from the
latter is more difficult as public confidence in perceived independence is
essential for the proper functioning of the courts.
B. Social and Professional Background
The social and professional background of members of the Austra-
lian bench is perhaps most remarkable for its striking homogeneity. The
general practice in Australia is still to recruit from the Senior Bar (i.e.,
Queen's Counsel). Little variation exists with Justice Teague of the
Supreme Court of Victoria, a former senior solicitor, proving the notable
exception. The exclusion of lawyers who are not members of the Senior
Bar means that few solicitors, women, academic or government lawyers
are appointed. Accordingly, there is a justified complaint that the Bench
tends to be almost exclusively Anglo-Celtic and upper middle class and
therefore not representative of the values of Australian society as a
whole which is growing increasingly pluralistic.
There are few women on Superior Courts in Australia and none on
the Supreme Court of Queensland. However, it must be borne in mind
that recruitment is from the senior ranks of the practicing bar. Judicial
office is not, as in many civil law countries, the culmination of a career
3 J.B. THOMAS, JUDICIAL ETVICS IN AUSTRALIA 3 (1988).
4 CRAWFORD, supra note 1, at 56.
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in magistracy which is commenced at a junior level, at a comparatively
early age. Appointment of women to the Superior Courts therefore de-
pends upon the availability of women barristers of appropriate seniority
and experience.
This situation is particularly topical at present. Although it may be
said that there are now such female candidates available, albeit, in rela-
tively small numbers, it by no means follows that they desire appoint-
ment for reasons discussed below. It is known that efforts have been
made to persuade women barristers of appropriate standing to go on to
the courts but so far only one woman has, at a comparatively early age,
been persuaded to accept an appointment to a District Court (the inter-
mediate court) in Queensland. Given the current rate at which universi-
ties are graduating women lawyers, many confidently predict that within
a generation, half the profession, barristers and solicitors will be women.
Arguably, this will carry with it a proportionate impact upon the num-
bers of women in the judiciary.
As touched on fleetingly above, mention should also be made about
the recruitment of solicitors and academics to the superior and district
courts. Academic appointments to courts throughout Australia are excep-
tionally rare. The Supreme Court of Queensland has one judge who held
an appointment as Professor of Law at the University of Queensland
(Mr. Justice Ryan). The appointment is widely regarded as a success,
however two things must be said. First, the judge did practice at the bar
in his early days and second, as a former Trade Commissioner and ap-
pointee to several related diplomatic posts, he brought with him addi-
tionally varied experiences.
Solicitors, like academics, have been similarly subordinated to se-
nior barristers in the selection process. With the exception of the senior
solicitor recently appointed to the Supreme Court of Victoria, Mr. Jus-
tice Teague, appointment of solicitors in any significant number has
been markedly limited to the specialized jurisdiction of the Family
Court.
Opposition to the appointment of solicitors is rooted in the tradi-
tional view that barristers, as experts in advocacy, are best suited to
effective court management. The merits of this view have been rein-
forced by the economic realities of economies of scale. The overheads
which must be carried by solicitors make it increasingly impractical for
them to spend time in courts. By contrast, barristers' comparatively low
overheads foster their development of advocacy expertise and specialized
knowledge bases. Predictably, it has traditionally suited both branches of
the profession for the bar to do the court work. It follows that it is
natural for appointments to a working judiciary with a large case load to
come from those experienced in litigation.
25319931
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However, based upon solicitor appointments thus far, no reason has
emerged to query the efficacy of such training for judicial decision-
making purposes. Although it can fairly be said that, even in appellate
work, prior experience in running cases at the trial level provides a
valuable safeguard against the type of injustices that could potentially
arise out of judicial unfamiliarity with court room tactics, it is equally
viable to point to specific strengths that training as a solicitor brings
with it. Additionally, as growing numbers of lawyers, for financial and
practical reasons, are taking on workloads that blur the traditional
barrister/solicitor distinction, these concerns are likely to diminish fur-
ther.
C. Capabilities of Would-be Judges
Contemporary concerns about judicial capabilities in Australia center
primarily on the overall availability of suitably qualified candidates.
Difficulties encountered in conjunction with appointing female candi-
dates, for example, the lack of individuals with coinciding experience
and interest, are arguably pervasive across the board. In short, the Aus-
tralian judiciary's perception in general is not so much that would-be
candidates lack talent but rather that many lack the experience.
Traditionally, judges of the superior courts tended to be appointed
in their fifties from members of the Senior Bar and to retire by force of
statute at the age of seventy. The rapid expansion of the judicial system
in the last ten to fifteen years has been occasioned not only by a greatly
increased work load for the courts but also by the Commonwealth's es-
tablishment of its own courts, notably the Federal Court of Australia and
the Family Court.5 Like other contemporary societies, increases in the
work loads may be attributed to a rising crime rate, increased commer-
cial activity and commercial disputes, and extensive expenditure on legal
aid.
Demand for judges to meet the increased judicial activity to which
reference has been made has meant that judges are being appointed at a
younger age. Moreover, the appointment of younger candidates is further
necessitated by the fact that experienced members of the practicing bar
generally command very large incomes and are reluctant to leave prac-
tice for the substantially less lucrative judicial salaries offered.
A less tangible factor underlying recruitment difficulties is the de-
mise of what has frequently been referred to as "the judicial mystique."
As a highly placed member of the judiciary succinctly observed:6
s The Commonwealth formerly used the courts of the States.
6 The judge wished to remain anonymous.
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Social change has meant that a judge is no longer the demi-god he
used to be. The press and the public are today more critical of judges.
Their decisions and behavior are now openly criticized. In the case of
the Family Court of Australia some judges have been the victims of
physical violence to the point of murder at the hands of the disappoint-
ed litigants. The mystique of judicial office has gone.
Australia, however, is hardly unique in this respect. Similar con-
cers appear to plague most common law jurisdictions to varying
extents.
III. EDUCATION OF JUDGES
The education of judges is not undertaken systematically in Austra-
lia. The modem judge is a university graduate who has practiced at the
bar as both a junior and a senior advocate. While at the bar the judge
will have attended various activities designed for his or her further edu-
cation. Upon joining the Bench, however, no parallel requirement or
program for continuing legal education exists. Australian judges attend
an annual conference of superior court judges at which topics of current
interest are discussed, usually after presentation of an appropriate paper.
Where a need for systematic education in a specific area is perceived,
the need tends to be met by the organization of ad hoe seminars and
the like.
The absence of formal training can be very problematic. The skills
required of a good advocate are not the same as those required of a
good judge. Nor are judges necessarily appointed in areas in which they
have practiced. For example, an appointee to the Family Court may not
have practiced in Family Law. Similarly, most judges sitting in criminal
matters have had limited experience in this field.
At times, new judges' inexperience with the relevant law or proce-
dure, or lack of familiarity with the decision making process and/or
judgment writing have rendered disappointing results. Courses for judi-
cial education have been slow to develop. This stems in part from the
traditional belief that a person upon appointment is presumed "to know
it all." Accordingly, some judges refuse to attend training courses on the
ground that it offends their dignity to admit publicly they have
something to learn. Some courts, such as the Family Court of Australia,
do provide training courses for new appointments on a purely voluntary
basis. But it may well be useful to require as a condition of appoint-
ment to judicial office at the trial level that the appointee undergo a
course of training.
Similar rationales apply to the institution of continuing education
programs for the judiciary. Constant change, especially in the fields of
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taxation, company, antitrust, and family law, pose considerable challeng-
es to even the most diligent practitioners and judicial officers. Despite
this reality, judicial tradition makes it difficult for some judges to admit
that they have anything to learn, even new law.
The reception and use of technology in the court system provides
another point of contention. Whether inherent in the traditional training
of lawyers or simply indigenous to many contemporary judicial incum-
bents, hostility to or suspiciousness of new technology (e.g., recording
and computing systems, and information technology) has resulted in fail-
ure to implement expensive equipment.
IV. TASKS OF JUDGES
The growing volume and complexity of case loads is a universal
problem, with the law mirroring the society of which it is a visible
expression.. Although Australia's relatively small population has curtailed
somewhat, the explosion of complex litigation found in countries like
the United States, the tasks of its judges have increased considerably
over the last twenty years. The by-gone perception that the role of the
judge was leisurely, a job suited for the semi-retirement of a busy prac-
titioner who was willing to exchange his high earning capacity for pres-
tige and a more relaxed lifestyle has rapidly bowed to the reality of
clogged court calendars, growing litigation costs, and increasingly chal-
lenging fact situations. Cases resolved through the simple application of
statutory or precedential law have necessarily become less common.
Regarding the supreme courts and the High Court, lawyers do not
admit that there is a growing demand for policy decisions. If this is
occurring, it is treated as an instance decision in an area of discretion
ordinarily created by statute. The policy issue is subsumed under one or
other of the relevant factual considerations. Judges ordinarily deny a
policy making function. However, this is not to say that the role of
Australian judges is purely passive. There are those who still believe the
fairy tale that the law is always pre-existing - clear and only awaiting
discovery by the judges - but this is far from reality, as the President of
the New South Wales Court of Appeal, the Honorable Justice Michael
Kirby, asserted. '"The debate has become not whether judges make law,
but how much, when, and how far they may go in a particular case."7
This is not to deny the Honorable Justice Thomas' assertion that
"the essence of the judicial process is the application of recognizable
7 Murphy: Bold Spirit of the Living Law, October 28, 1987
(Inaugural Lionel Murphy Memorial Lecture).
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law to the facts proved in a particular case. ' 8 There is considerable
scope for judicial activism in the creation of law through the extension
or adaptation of principles to new situations, and through construction,
refinement, and analogy to mention but a few methods. As the Honor-
able Justice Michael Kirby writes:9
Inevitably, as in any court, some of the work is routine. Some is even
uninteresting. But much is important. The opportunities for judicial
development, restatement and simplification of the law present them-
selves quite frequently. From my vantage point, some things are clear.
A change is coming upon the Australian legal scene. With the end of
the Privy Council appeals and the end of the appeals as of right to the
High Court of Australia, the role of the High Court is changing. It is
now, truly, a final court of rare resort. Inevitably, much of its time is
taken up in constitutional cases concerning federal legislation of Aus-
tralia-wide application. For more than ninety-eight percent of the cases,
the state appellate courts, and the Full Courts of the Federal and Fami-
ly Courts, are the end of the litigious line. It therefore falls in-
creasingly to them to expound and develop the common law in Austra-
lia. Save for the contingency of the relatively rare instances of special
leave to appeal being granted by the High Court, they will be the final
expositors of the general principles of law and equity and of statutory
construction. This is a reason why we must become more knowledge-
able in every part of Australia of the fine work of the other Australian
appellate courts. We must borrow from each other more in the future
than we have in the past. Happily technology, and improved reporting
services, will facilitate this development.
The judiciary is reluctant to involve itself in investigative and ad-
ministrative functions distinct from their judicial work. Although the
Royal Commission and other commissions of inquiry perform functions
of a quasi-judicial nature, calling for the evaluation of material and the
formation of opinions on matters of which judicial skills and experience
are suitable, judicial practices, principles, and procedures are not always
fully applicable to inquiries, and the involvement of judges in adminis-
trative functions (other than those related to the exercise of judicial
power) has serious disadvantages. As E.G. Fitzgerald records:"0
The separation of judicial power from legislative and executive power
s THOMAS, supra note 3, at 29.
9 See A CAREER IN LAW 215 (J. Corkery ed., 2nd ed. 1989).
10 See REPORT OF THE INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND ASSOCIATED POLI-
cy MiscoNDucr 328 (June 29, 1989).
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is fundamental to the system of checks and balances designed to
achieve a stable democracy. The distinction should not be blurred by
those who perform judicial functions also engaging in superficially
similar quasi-judicial functions on behalf of the Executive Government.
The essential independence and impartiality of the judiciary, or at least
the almost equally important public acceptance of those judicial quali-
ties, particularly in a social environment in which much litigation, and
almost all criminal litigation, involves disputes between individual
citizens and the State, should not be compromised by judicial officers
mixing judicial functions with functions on behalf of the Executive,
especially where the issues may attract political or other controversy.
The primary responsibility of the judicial system is the provision of
speedy and efficient justice according to law, and its capacity to per-
form that function is diminished by any requirement that it perform
other tasks on behalf of the Executive.
Moreover, the nature of many inquiries involves an immersion into
highly emotional and charged political environments, for example the
Mt. Erebus Air New Zealand aircraft disaster conducted by Mr. Justice
Mahon of the Supreme Court of New Zealand. His description of senior
executives of Air New Zealand engaging in "an orchestrated litany of
lies" caused a huge political storm and he resigned following severe
criticism of his commission.
Judges exert caution in the non-official roles and activities which
they pursue. Thomas observes:"
Most of us, I think, try to keep a low profile, and even to minimize
close relationships with members of the Bar in case they are misinter-
preted.
Ethical duties bind judges both in the exercise of their official
functions and in their private lives. They must abstain from conduct
which may cause members of the public to question their standards or
which may weaken the public trust that permits the acceptance of judg-
ments as honest unprejudiced decisions based on the evidence.
The publicity-conscious judge, although perhaps intending to popu-
larize the judiciary, may actually lower its prestige.'2 Headline hunting
may rebound on judges. 3
Judges in Australia do not readily admit to any conflicting require-
ments of creativity, neutrality, or integrity. Judges at all but the highest
t' THOMAS, supra note 3, at 33.
22 id. at 36.
13 R. Munday, The Judicial Right of Reply, 46 CAMBRIDGE LJ. 303 (1987).
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appellate levels tend to operate reasonably comfortably within parameters
established by legislation and case law. The highest courts break new
ground in certain areas of which promissory estoppel, damages for eco-
nomic loss and a restatement of long established understanding of the
constitution of the country are leading examples. While some see this as
a form of maverick keltic wilfulness, it is probably fair to say that simi-
lar tendencies are to be perceived in most parts of the judicial world.
However, none of this says anything about judicial neutrality, which
means neutrality between the parties and not in terms of one's socio-
legal attitude. Similarly, integrity implies an absence of improper moti-
vation: it cannot mean that the judge trims his or her apprehension of
principle because strict application of principle may be to the detriment
of one or other party.
V. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Crawford states: 4
[I]t is a fundamental principle that a person once appointed a judge,
should be independent of executive direction or control. This is the un-
disputed core of the notion of separation of powers. Judges decide
legal disputes between government and government, between govern-
ment and private citizen, and it is essential that they be independent of
any party. Even in cases between subject and subject, there would be
no point in the elaborate presentation of evidence and argument if the
decision depended on external direction. Judicial independence is fun-
damental to any system of justice...
Security of tenure is essential for judicial independence. The Aus-
tralian Constitution provides in Section 72 that High Court Justices and
other federal judges shall not be removed except by the Governor Gen-
eral in Council, on an address from both Houses of Parliament in the
same session, praying for such removal on the ground of proved misbe-
havior or incapacity.
In the context of the lengthy proceedings against Justice Murphy of
the High Court, the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry took the view
that the words "proved misbehavior or incapacity" were hot restricted to
serious criminal offenses or misconduct in office but extended to any
conduct which, judged by the standards of the time, was so serious as
to demonstrate the judge's unfitness to hold office.
The judges of the supreme court of the states in Australia enjoy
statutory but not constitutional protection. In all states, supreme court
14 CRAFORD, supra note 1, at 56.
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judges are appointed during good behavior. However, with the exception
of New South Wales, the removal of a judge on an address of Parlia-
ment is not conditioned upon misbehavior or incapacity, as it is under
Section 72. For example, Section 15 of the Constitution Act 1967
(Queensland) provides for tenure during good behavior but Section 16 of
the Act provides that "it shall be lawful nevertheless for Her Majesty to
remove any such judge or judges upon the address of the Legislative
Assembly." It follows that (except in New South Wales) the Houses
may in law move an address for removal on any ground at all. How-
ever, in practice this is extremely unlikely. For instance, the recent
removal of Mr. Angelo Vasta, QC, from office as a judge of the Su-
preme Court of Queensland was a result of extensive investigations and
findings of a Parliamentary Judges Commission of Inquiry where mis-
conduct in respect of taxation matters were clearly proven.
In New South Wales, controversy surrounding the trials of Mur-
phy 5 led to the New South Wales Parliament passing the Judicial Offi-
cers Act of 1986. This Act governs the tenure of judicial officers at all
levels (including magistrates). Judicial Officers hold office "during abili-
ty and good behavior." They may be removed only on address of both
Houses of Parliament, and only if the Conduct Division of the Judicial
Commission, established by the Act, has reported a matter which could
justify removal.
The procedure of removal by address of Parliament is not without
its deficiencies. In the cases of Justice Murphy who had been a cabinet
minister, this circumstance made it impossible for some members on
both sides of Parliament to consider the case in an apolitical manner. As
Sir Harry Gibbs states:' 6
It is enough to say that damaging allegations concerning the judge
were made publicly early in 1984, and were still the subject of investi-
gation when the judge died in October, 1986.
A Report of an Advisory Committee on the Australian Judicial
System (May 1987) has highlighted the difficulties which the parliamen-
tarians comprising the committees investigating Lionel Murphy had in
dealing with legal issues and the prolonged, uncertain, and highly publi-
cized proceedings. The Advisory Committee accordingly has recom-
mended that a judicial tribunal should be established to which serious
allegations made against a judge could be referred without delay to
enable it to decide whether the allegations are capable of being sus-
" 61 A.L.R. 139 (High Court 1985), 63 A.L.R. 53 (N.S.W.C.A. 1985), 64 A.L.R. 498 (19-
85) (Hunt J); Ford 60 A.L.R. 269 (1985).
16 Sir Harry Gibbs, The Appointment and Removal of Judges, 17 FED. L. REv. 147 (1987).
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tained by the evidence. Facts found to amount to misbehavior or inca-
pacity warranting removal would be communicated to Parliament for its
resolution.
Security of tenure and judicial independence may be threatened in
less obvious ways. One possibility lies in the abolition of a court, or its
reconstitution under new legislation accompanied by a refusal to reap-
point some previous judges. A recent example is that of Justice Jim
Staples, formerly of the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commis-
sion. Jim Staples was one of the deputy presidents of the old institution
- all the deputy presidents moved on to the new body, the Federal In-
dustrial Relations Commission, except Staples. It is asserted that his de
facto removal from the Industrial Relations Commission will threaten the
independence of other judicial or regulatory bodies and threaten the
longevity of any judge who has the temerity to question the accepted
order of things.' 7
Security of tenure and judicial independence may be threatened
through remuneration provisions. It is usually provided that judicial sala-
ries may not be decreased during tenure of office.'" Such protection
may not be enough. Sir Ninian Stephen commented: 9
Judges salaries should be lifted to put them beyond the reach of temp-
tation and to secure their independence from government. Judicial
independence is threatened by the erosion of judicial salaries and judi-
cial independence is threatened where the sporadic and partial correc-
tion of the process of erosion is left to depend upon' the very arms of
government of which the judiciary should be independent - it being
dependent upon the executive for effective initiation and upon the
legislature for implementation.
There were many good reasons for ensuring proper and, in real
terms, secure salaries and pensions for judges. Questions of recruitment
of suitable candidates to judicial office, of retention once appointed, of
public respect for the judicial office in a community that tends to mea-
sure most things in money terms, and perhaps even questions of plac-
ing judges in a financial position beyond the reach of temptation.
[I]n the long term, by affecting the whole quality of the judiciary and
their repute, the matter of remuneration bears quite directly on judicial
17 See AUSTL. FIN. REV., March 8, 1989.
'8 See CoNsT. § 72(iii).
'" See THE AUSTRALIAN, July 26, 1989. Sir Ninian's speech to the Australian Institute of
Judicial Administration followed Federal Cabinet's decision to approve a 15 to 20 percent pay
increase for federal judges. The decision was a compromise after Cabinet refused to implement
increases as high as 80 percent or $100,000 a year originally proposed by the Remuneration
Tribunal in November 1988.
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independence.
However, there are limits to the protections which legitimately can
be afforded to judges' remuneration. For example, in Krause v. Commis-
sioner for Inland Revenue 0 Krause, a judge, appealed against his as-
sessment for income tax on. the ground that the imposition of the tax
was contrary to a constitutional provision that judges' remuneration may
not be reduced during their continuance in office. In rejecting the ap-
peal, the Court held:2
The purpose of this provision is . . . to safeguard the independence of
the judiciary .... Though in theory Parliament is free ... to repeal
the provision, it would require the clearest expression of intention to
induce the Court to hold that Parliament intended to depart from so
sound a principle . . .. There is nothing ... in the Income Tax
Act ... which shows an intention on the part of Parliament to do so.
I am of the opinion that income tax does not diminish the remunera-
tion of a judge. His remuneration is paid to him in order to meet his
expenses, and one of these expenses is the income tax.
Judicial independence is also very largely dependent upon judges
having administrative control of their own affairs. The Honorable Justice
R.E. McGarvie, Judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria writes:'
A court in which those responsible to the executive decide the way in
which the operations of the court will be managed, the way cases will
progress towards hearing and which cases will be heard by which
judge at which time, is not likely to produce the impartial strength and
independence of mind which the community requires of its judges. The
relationship between administrators and judges will tend to develop to
one where the judges are well cared for and even prized, but are treat-
ed as senior staff who do specialized public work in the courts which
the administrators run on behalf of the executive.
2 1929 AD 286.
21 Id.
22 R.E. McGarvie, Judicial Responsibility for Operation of the Court System 63 AuSTL. L. J.
79 (1989).
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